Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated by unknown
NOTES AND COMMENTS
BANK CHARTER, BRANCHING, HOLDING COMPANY AND
MERGER LAWS: COMPETITION FRUSTRATED
ENTRY, branching, acquisition by a holding company, and merger influence
the size and number of banks in the industry. While non-legal factors induce
the undertaking of these activities, their accomplishment is the subject of an
extensive legal framework. This Comment attempts to determine what kind of
banking structure is most desirable, whether the existing legal framework
fosters such a structure, and, if not, what changes should be made in the exist-
ing framework.
A BASIS FOR EVALUATION
Decisions by bank regulatory agencies whether a new bank should be char-
tered, a new branch established, or an existing bank acquired by a holding
company or merged into another bank may have in common the question of
whether more or fewer banking alternatives are desirable. Were the traditional
American predilection for business competition adopted,1 the conclusion that
numerous banking alternatives are desirable would follow. 2 Competition can
function only if bank-users-primarily borrowers and depositors-may choose
among a number of banking institutions,3 and if this choice is based upon
which institution makes the most attractive offer.4 Thus, since banks need
sufficient deposits to maintain revenue-producing loan volume,5 each bank must
1. Compare S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955), with S. REP. No. 196,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959) and H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960) ;
see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945);
ATT'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 1-3 (1955); NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23-25 (1960); WuLcox, PUBLIC PoUcIEs TOWARD
BUSINESS 49-50 (rev. ed. 1960).
2. See Anderson, Competitive Factors in Business Loans, in BUSINESS LOANS OF
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKS 299 (Beckhart ed. 1959) ; Adelman, Effective Competition
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1298 (1948) ("monopoly and competition
... are matters of degree, of the ease or difficulty of substitution, of the availability of
'sufficient' alternatives to buyers and sellers") ; Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis
for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 405, 413 (1951) ("The most im-
portant requisite of Effective Competition is the existence of adequate alternatives.").
3. See ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 21 (1954).
4. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11. A more attractive offer includes not only dif-
ferences in price, but also differences in such other items of cost as services, location,
architecture, and personnel. If, for example, pleasing bank architecture satisfies a customer
better than other qualities, his selection of a well-designed bank is not anti-competitive
because, as banks compete to attract his business, his choice will efficiently allocate re-
sources to fulfillment of his desires.
5. HAT, MoNEY, DEBT, AND ECONOMIC Acnvny 32 (2d ed. 1953).
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offer depositors advantages at least as favorable as those provided by other
banks so that funds will not be attracted away. Likewise, a bank must offer
borrowers advantages at least as favorable as other banks offer. Motivated by
a desire to maximize profits, 6 a banker will expand operations so long as the
revenue derived from additional transactions covers the cost of making them.7
But to effect any increase in loan volume,8 a bank must offer both borrowers
and depositors terms more favorable than those offered by the other banks avail-
able to them. Since each bank must vie with other banks in satisfying borrowers
through such advantages as low interest rates, and depositors through such
advantages as high interest rates on time deposits or low service charges on
demand deposits, the banking system will efficiently allocate depositors' funds
to borrowers' needs.9
If the number of alternatives is substantially reduced, however, bank-users'
choices may not force efficient bank behavior. Where there is only one bank,
bank users can not, except by refusing to deal, use their patronage to express
disapproval of its policies. 10 Even where there are a few banks but each bank
knows that any advantage it offers borrowers or depositors will immediately
be imitated by other banks, nullifying any expected gains, there is little incen-
tive to benefit customers." In following the leader, these banks will, in effect,
act as one bank, offering bank users no real opportunity to "go elsewhere."
Moreover, such a reduction in banking alternatives may reduce credit avail-
ability to marginal risk borrowers. Since risk appraisal is a highly subjective
exercise, banks are likely to differ reasonably as to the credit worthiness of a
borrower.12 Thus, a borrower who would qualify under some methods of risk
appraisal, but not under others, has less opportunity to obtain credit the fewer
the available alternatives. Because new businesses and expanding small busi-
nesses are generally marginal risk borrowers,' 3 decreased credit availability
may affect the competitiveness and growth of the rest of the economy. Apart
from unintentional differences in credit appraisal, decreased alternatives may
6. WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
7. See SAMUELSON, ECOiOMCS 459-67 (4th ed. 1958).
8. Although investment of bank resources may also yield revenue, and "investors" can
be read for "borrowers" in the textual analysis, attention has been directed to lending be-
cause that is the "characteristic role" of commercial banks. See ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 11-12.
9. See WILcox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11-13; ATT'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 317-18 (1955) ; SAMUELSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 39-42.
10. See Wnmcox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11.
11. See Robinson, What is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q.J. EcoN. 104 (1935) ; SAMUEL-
SON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 488; Chandler, Monopolistic Elements in Commercial Bank-
ing, 46 J. POL. EcoNT. 1, 9 (1938).
12. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FINANCING SMALL BUSINESS 411 (1958). Since the
granting of loans is a highly confidential process, Chandler, supra note 11, at 6, inter-bank
intelligence requisite to the consciously parallel action which prevails in areas of few banks
will not be present. Thus, although such action may standardize loan terms in these areas,
it will not affect differences in credit availability.
13. FEDERAL REsERvE BOARD, op. cit. mpra note 12, at 402-03.
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increase the probability of credit discrimination. Two banks, for example, which
finance all the shoe retailers in their area may refuse to grant credit even to a
low-risk borrower planning to open another shoe store. Whether the bankers'
belief that a new competitor would impair the existing retailers' ability to re-
pay is justified, such action could deprive the public of increased shoe com-
petition.1 4
But competition may be unworkable in banking, or the number of banking
alternatives sufficient to allow effective customer choice may be undesirable
for other reasons. Economies of scale in the banking industry may be so great
that monopoly would inevitably result. The money market in which banks are
but one of many kinds of financial institutions may be so competitive that even
a single giant bank could not behave as a monopolist. Overzealous attempts at
profit maximization without due concern for risk may result in insolvency,
defeating legitimate expectations of depositors. Either overly liberal or overly
conservative loan policies motivated by erroneous profit maximization or sol-
vency appraisals may overexpand or unduly contract the nation's money sup-
ply, producing severe inflationary or deflationary consequences. Whether any
of these factors substantially impairs the usefulness of effective banking alter-
natives or makes them unimportant is crucial in deciding whether numerous
alternatives are desirable.
If banks became more efficient as they grew larger, larger banks, by reason
of their increased efficiency, could underbid smaller banks until only a giant
bank, in place of a large number of banking alternatives, remained.1r (This
result would probably evoke a system of governmentally franchised monopoly
combined with rate and service regulation.) Available economic analysis,1
however, indicates that as the size of the bank increases costs decline for unit
banks,17 but increase for banks having branches ;18 evidence for systems where-
in stock of member banks is held by one corporation is unavailable. 9 Even
among unit banks, however, unit costs are fairly constant among those having
$2,000,000 to $50,000,000 in deposits ;20 only the very large and the very small
unit banks differ significantly.21 This difference is apparently a consequence of
the high proportion of low-cost large loans and low-cost demand deposits char-
acteristic of large banks.22 But whether larger banks effect significant operat-
14. But see ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 226-27. For another example of the
possibility of bank influence restricting competition in non-financial markets, see Berle,
Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 589, 603-04 (1949).
15. See BOWMAN & BACH, EcoNomic ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 302-19 (2d ed.
1949).
16. Research has disclosed but one study of bank efficiency-ALHADEFF, op. Cit. supra
note 3, at 77-107. Unfortunately, Professor Alhadeff's data provide no breakdown more
detailed than labor economies, interest economies, and miscellaneous economies.
17. ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 83.
18. Id. at 87-88.
19. Cf. NADLER & BOGEN, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY 18 (1959).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 85-86.
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ing efficiencies is not known ;23 the available evidence intimates that they are
not significant. 24 Moreover, if further empirical analysis reveals that increased
size effects significant economies in a few well-defined, mechanical banking
operations, these could probably be handled on a group basis, while policy
decisions remained unaffected. For example, bookkeeping, a significant item of
expense in banking operations, can now be expedited by electronic computing
machines.25 Although the high cost of such devices may preclude their acquisi-
tion by the smaller bank, a group of such banks could and indeed has enjoyed
these machine-age benefits by sharing the use of an automated bookkeeping
center jointly owned.26 The banks can act independently, however, in such
matters as granting loans or attracting deposits.
Since commercial banks are but one kind of credit institution, the availability
of other credit sources might render decreases in bank alternatives unimpor-
tant. Mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, postal savings ac-
counts, and U.S. government bonds offer alternatives to bank time deposits. 27
In addition, mutual savings banks, saving and loan associations, and life insur-
ance companies compete with banks for long term loans, especially real estate
mortgages. 28 But time deposits constitute about 35 per cent of bank resources 29
and real estate loans only 24 per cent of bank loans.30 By far the more impor-
23. Although Professor Alhadeff mentions labor economies resulting from specializa-
tion and miscellaneous economies, both of which are made possible by large volume, id. at
86-87, he does not and, indeed, from his data, cannot say how important they are.
24. Since Professor Alhadeff has found that both the size and kind of loan charac-
teristic of different sized banks are "important" determinants of economies in larger banks,
it is questionable how important economies which result from operating efficiencies are.
Moreover, in comparing branch banks and small unit banks, Professor Alhadeff states:
"Neither publicly available statistics nor those made available for this study provide proof
that branch banks can negotiate a small loan more cheaply than a small (or medium) unit
bank because of cost economies integrally related to branch banking." There is only a
"strong presumption . . . [of] net economies." Id. at 102-05. See also COMMISsION ON
MONEY & CREDIT, MONEY AND CREDIT 165 (1961) ("The evidence suggests that small unit
banks can compete successfully with large banks even in the long run.").
25. See Halton, Making Automation a Reality, Burroughs Clearing House, May 1960,
p. 35.
26. Centralizing Accounting, Banking, April 1960, p. 44; Three Smaller Banks Pioneer
in Bookkeeping Center, Burroughs Clearing House, March 1960, p. 15; see also Coopera-
tive Automation for Smaller Banks, Banking, June 1959, p. 58.
27. HART, op. cit. supra note 5, at 123-29; GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINAN-
CIAL POLICY 445-55, 464-66 (3d ed. 1955) ; SAMUELSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 288; see
generally FREEMAN, MUTUAL CoMPETIIoN (1959); Alhadeff & Alhadeff, The Struggle
for Commercial Bank Savings, 72 Q.J. EcoN. 1 (1958).
28. Ibid.
29. See 47 FED. RESERvE BULL.. 1197 (1961) (time and demand deposits compared for
commercial banks).
30. See 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1200 (1961) (real estate loans compared with total
loans) ; see also ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11. Commercial banks also compete
to some extent with finance companies for personal loans. See HART, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 128-29. But since the finance companies borrow their loanable funds from banks and
relend to high risk borrowers at high interest rates, competition with commercial banks is
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tant bank operations are acceptance of demand deposits and extension of busi-
ness loans.31 Banks apparently have little competition in these functions.32 The
nearest alternative, trade credit provided by finance companies or suppliers,33
is an imperfect substitute because of its high interest cost.34 Moreover, since
banks are the only institution which can accept demand deposits, 3 5 a very cheap
source of loanable funds, it seems doubtful that monopolistic bank practices in
these functions could ever induce the emergence of alternatives. Bankers would
raise the price of credit to a point just below the price at which other institutions
could acquire loanable funds by methods more costly than acceptance of de-
mand deposits.8 6
Overzealous attempts at profit maximization by competing banks might in-
duce insolvency. In an effort to increase profits, banks may lend to undepend-
able borrowers because they can obtain higher interest rates for the greater
risks.37 In addition, in some areas there may be so many banks that some or
all may have to lend to risky enterprises to stay in business.38 But if these risks
become too numerous or too great, frequent bank insolvencies may result.
Since bank capital normally provides less than 10 per cent of bank assets,30 the
greatest burden of these insolvencies would fall on depositors. This result
seems unfair in view of depositors' expectations. Usually, those with savings
accounts have chosen to deposit their money in banks, rather than to hoard,
because, regardless of the interest rate,40 they expect that their funds will be
safer there. Those with checking accounts rely primarily on banks to provide
a medium of exchange.41 In neither case do depositors believe they are making
an investment with risk of loss. Since banks presumably benefit from these
modest expectations by paying depositors less than they would have to pay in-
limited. Ibid.; see also ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16-17; Moran v. State Banking
Comm'r, 322 Mich. 230, 239-40, 33 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1948).
31. See HART, op. cit. supra note 5, at 39 ("The great bulk of commercial bank de-
posits are 'demand deposits.'"). ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12 ("business loans are
the largest single component in commercial bank loan portfolios").
32. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND ComPrrrioN IN BANKING 19 (1954).
33. Id. at 12-19.
34. Id. at 14-15.
35. By definition, banks are institutions which accept deposits, 1 MIcrIn, BANKS AND
BANKING ch. 1, § 2 (1956) ; see also HART, op. cit. supra note 5, at 21.
36. Cf. Hodgman, The Deposit Relationship and Commercial Bank Investment Be-
havior, 43 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 257, 264 (1961) ; see also Peoples Savings Bank v.
Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 330-32, 102 N.W.2d 777, 794 (1960).
37. See Harfield, Legal Restraints on Expanding Banking Facilities, Competition and
the Public Interest, 14 Bus. LAW. 1016, 1021 n.5 (1959).
38. See generally EcoNomIc POLICY CommIssIoN OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS Asso-
CIATION, THE BANK CHARTERING HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1935);
see also Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 606-09, 118 Pac. 80, 84 (1911).
39. See HART, op. cit. supra note 5, at 36.
40. Alhadeff & Alhadeff, supra note 27, at 6; see also Does Higher Interest Lure More
Money Into Savingsf, Bus. Week, March 16, 1957, p. 190.
41. SAaIUELSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 288.
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vestors for loanable funds, it would be inequitable to depositors if banks did
not fulfill these expectations. Moreover, because bank insolvencies destroy
sources of credit, not only borrowers but also others who rely upon the bor-
rowers' ability to secure loans may be adversely affected.
42
Governmental regulation could and, in fact, has minimized the problems of
bank insolvency without substantially impairing competition. The conclusion
that many bank failures are caused by entry of banks into areas unable to sup-
port them has led to control over entry,43 the most significant governmental
limitation upon competition. In addition to meeting capital and managerial re-
quirements, 44 prospective entrants must demonstrate a public need indicating
prospects of successful operation without impairing existing banks. 45 While
this control allows as many banking alternatives in an area as free entry would
provide in the long run,46 it qualifies the ability of prospective banks to displace
existing ones. It is probable, however, that prospective banks will most often
seek entry into areas where banking opportunities are expanding 47 or, if dis-
placement is the goal, acquisition of existing banks remains a mode of entry.
In addition, government exercises control over bank assets. Types of bank
investments are limited.48 Loans as well as investments are periodically ex-
amined by government agencies to determine whether they meet minimal risk
standards. 49 And apart from the risk qualities of individual assets, central bank
controls on credit expansion may act as a caveat to banks lending an excessive
proportion of deposits.r0 Governmental agencies also insure deposits up to
$10,000.r' Since losses (and resulting insolvency) are the antitheses of profit
42. See Berle, supra note 14, at 592; Harfield, supra note 38, at 1021; Wall v. Fenner,
76 S.D. 252, 255, 76 N.W2d 722, 724 (1956).
43. See note 39 supra and Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications
for New Banks and Branches, 74 BANKING L.J. 921, 922-23 (1957).
44. See notes 63-69 infra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 70-82 infra and accompanying text.
46. In areas capable of supporting only a few banks, consciously parallel action will
occur. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. Even in these areas, however, more rather
than fewer alternatives are desirable because even though credit terms will be similar
whether, say, 2 or 4 banks follow each other, credit availability to marginal risk borrowers
will increase with more alternatives. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. The alter-
native of regulating bank charges and service in the less populous areas while fostering
competition in more populous areas seems too complicated even if workable. See Peoples
Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 332-34, 102 N.W.2d 777, 795 (1960).
47. See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., 44 Stat. 1226 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1960), and
12 C.F.R. §§ 1-6 (1959) ; see also Harfield, supra note 37, at 1022.
49. See, e.g., 38 Stat. 271 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 481 (Supp. 1960) ; see
generally 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958); Paulger, Policy and
Procedure in Bank Examination, in BANKING STUDIES 213 (1941); HART, op. cit. slupra
note 5, at 89-91.
50. The primary purpose of these controls, however, is regulation of bank creation
of money. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RE-
SERVE SYSTEM 15 (3d ed. 1954) ; SAMUELSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 297.
51. SAMUELSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 298-99.
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maximization, these governmental restraints on the risks bankers may assume
do not, to the extent the controls are not overzealous, limit rational competi-
tive behavior. The ideal profit maximizer would restrain himself voluntarily.
Since loans provided by deposits in one bank become the deposits of a second
bank available for use again as loans and so on, the entire system theoretically
multiples the volume of money by the reciprocal of the fraction of deposits
retained. 2 Attempts to maximize profits by heavy lending in boom periods
when credit demand is high and risks appear low, or by niggard lending in
periods of depression when credit demand is lower and risks appear greater,
may introduce another problem-bank creation of money which aggravates in-
flationary or deflationary pressures. 53 A central agency, however, could attempt
to control these tendencies without impairing competition among banks. In-
deed, by use of its open market, reserve, and rediscount powers,54 the Federal
Reserve Board attempts to regulate the national supply of credit to "foster
orderly economic growth and a stable dollar.''m But since Board control ends
with a determination of the national credit supply,56 and since pressures to in-
crease or decrease interest costs are uniform through the banking systems of
large regions, 57 the allocation of this credit supply can still be efficiently accom-
plished by competitive forces because each bank's share of that supply will still
depend upon how well it attracts business by satisfying customers. s
Even though monetary controls do not impair competitive behavior among
banks, they might be accomplished more easily or effectively through a small
number of banking alternatives. Without resort to formal regulations, monetary
authorities might easily convince a small group of banks to adopt a particular
course of action. But just as it is easier to contact and persuade a few giant
banks, it is easier for one obstinate giant to defeat the government's policies.
Moreover, it would be far easier for a small number of giant banks to act in
concert and dictate their collective decisions on monetary policy to the monetary
authorities. 59 In addition, to the extent that monetary policies can be effected
through cost pressures rather than psychological means, a large number of
banking alternatives competing to attract business by satisfying customers
52. For detailed explanation of bank money creation, see id. at 299-308; H. ar, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 64-70; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, op. Cit.
supra note 50, at 21-25.
53. See HART, op. cit. supra note 5, at 35.
54. See BOARD OF GOvERNoRS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, op. cit. supra note 50,
at 31-55.
55. Id. at 1.
56. See id. at 11.
57. Since Federal Reserve policy is implemented through regional banks in twelve
districts, id. at 71-77, within these districts changes in lending costs, resulting, for example,
from changes in rediscounting costs, will be uniform. Moreover, since regional Reserve
Bank decisions affecting lending costs are reviewed by the Board of Governors in Wash-
ington, id. at 77-78, monetary policy is likely to be uniform throughout the country.
58. FEDERAL REsERvE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 431 (1958).
59. The charge that regulatory agencies become the captive of the industry regulated
is often repeated; see GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 27-28 (remarks of Warner
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seems desirable, at least in inflationary periods. Since banks behaving com-
petitively presumably have lower profits than banks under less customer pres-
sure, changes, especially increases, in the cost of additional lending have a
greater effect on profit margins, which in turn influence output decisions. 0
Where a bank has a cushion of monopoly profit, it is not as imperative that it
change its output to adjust to changes in cost, and even if it is maximizing
profits, it may believe that immediate price and output adjustments may hurt
long run profits.0 ' In deflationary periods, however, where cost is to act as an
inducement rather than a restraint on bank activities, and where all banks are
reluctant to lend for reasons of risk not cost, it might be easier for the monetary
authority to "tell" a few banks to lend. Since it is arguable that psychological
controls are better effected through a few banks, but it seems likely competitive
banks are more responsive to cost controls, there is little reason to conclude
that monetary policy would be better effected through fewer banking alterna-
tives.
In sum, therefore, neither the nature of banks and the money market nor
banking regulation to control solvency and money creation offer any strong
reasons that the industry should not provide bank-users enough alternatives so
that their choice will effectively induce efficient bank operation and resource
allocation. And, thus, the congressional policy that "competition is desirable in
banking"0' 2 would appear to encounter no serious obstacles.
ENTRY AND BRANCHING
Bank structure may be expanded by entrance of new banks or by branching
of existing banks. Since both processes may increase consumer alternatives,
charter and branching statutes are discussed together.
To minimize bank failures, bank supervisory agencies limit entry to banks
capable of generating consistent profits. 63 Minimum amounts of invested capital
are required 64 to cushion losses on bank assets. 65 In addition, the prospective
entrant must have retained management qualified to conduct profitable opera-
W. Wagner), 40 (remarks of Thurman Arnold), 69 (remarks of Professor Marvin H.
Bernstein), 76-78 (remarks of Professor Louis J. Jaffe) (1960) ; see also S. REP. No. 196,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-29 (1959).
60. Cf. Hodgman, supra note 36, at 267-68.
61. See ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 168-70.
62. See note 1 supra.
63. See Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80, 84 (1911) ; State ex rel. Dodd v.
Hill, 84 W. Va. 437, 100 S.E. 286, 288 (1919). There has been a long time history of
political conflict between state and federal chartering authorities, see EcoNomic PoLIcy
COMMISSlON OF THE AmERiCAN BANKERS AssOcIATION, op. cit. supra note 38, which has
interfered with their espoused purposes. For evidence that this conflict is not yet over, see
Leuhrs v. Spaulding, 80 Idaho 326, 328 P.2d 582 (1958) ; KIAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1802
(4) (1950).
64. See, e.g., 31 Stat. 48 (1900), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1958) (national banks).
65. FREEMAN, THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE BANK CAPITAL 11 (1952).
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tions.66 While there has been some criticism of the amounts of capital re-
quired 67 or the method of ascertaining the capabilities of prospective manage-
ment,68 that these factors are relevant in minimizing the probability of failure
is undisputed.69
In addition to the applicant's qualifications, banking authorities investigate
the entrant's prospective market. Since solvency is a function of profitability,
and profitability a function of business transacted,70 both state and federal
statutes permit entry only when a bank can develop sufficient business to cover
costs plus a reasonable profit.71 The most explicit provisions require the appli-
cant bank to have prospects of "sufficient business," 72 "successful operations," 73
or favorable earnings.74 Others approach the problem from the consumer's per-
spective, requiring proof of "public necessity,"7 5 "public need,176 "public de-
mand," 77 or that a community can support a new bank,78 or, more obliquely,
66. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 4.1(b) (1959) (Comptroller of the Currency must consider
"the general character of its management").
67. See generally FREEMAN, op. Cit. supra note 65.
68. See Application of Millburn-Short Hills Bank, 59 N.J. Super. 470, 476-77, 158
A.2d 66, 68-69 (1959) ; Application of State Bank of Plainfield, 61 N.J. Super. 150, 159-60,
160 A.2d 299, 304 (1960).
69. O'CoNNoR, BANKS UNDER ROOSEVELT 81-82 (1938) (incompetent management
given 32% of time as reason for bank failure between 1865 and 1936); WHrTTLESEy,
BANKING AND THE NEW DEAL 2 (1935); ECONOMIC POLICY CoMMIssiON, AMERICAN
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE BANK CHARTERING HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE UNITED
STATES 33-43 (1935) ; Liang, The Banking Structure of the United States in the Twentieth
Century, 1952, p. 184 (unpublished thesis in Catholic University of America library) ; see
Floyd v. Thornton, 68 S.E.2d 334 (1951).
70. EcoNOMIc POLICY COMMIssION, op. cit. supra note 69, at 39.
71. See Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for New Banks
and Branches, 74 BANKING L.J. 921 (1957).
72. See ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 86 (1960) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 287.050 (1955);
ME. IEV. STAT. ch. 59, § 19-B (Supp. 1959); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.030 (Supp. 1960);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-4 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REV. STAT. 8 707.080 (1959); TEx.
REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. §§ 342-345 (1959).
73. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-53(7) (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.03 (Supp.
1960); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 23.754 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-11 (1950).
74. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16Y2, § 110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, § 55 (1951); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 13-44 (1959); 13 Stat. 102 (1864), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1958), 12 C.F.R. § 4.1(b) (1959).
75. See ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 86 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-201(A)
(1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-303 (1957) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-225 (Supp. 1960) ;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1802 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.754 (1957); N . REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (Supp. 1958) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 55 (1951) ; TEx. REv. Cry.
STAT. ANN. § 342-305 (1959) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 6-31 (1949).
76. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-205 (1957); CAL. FINANCIAL CODE ANN. § 361(b);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-53(7) (c) (1960) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.03 (Supp. 1960) ; GA.
CODE ANN. § 13-905 (Supp. 1958); N.D. CENT. CODE 6-02-06 (1960); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6-31 (1949).
77. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 45.04 (Supp. 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-4
(Supp. 1959).
78. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.03 (Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-5 (1954);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-306 (1939); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 30.08.030 (1959).
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that the public convenience and advantage will be served. 79 While most statutes
focus on the applicant bank's own prospects," some inquire whether its ex-
pected business will come from other banks, impairing their condition,81 or
whether existing banks are providing adequate service in the area.82
These statutes allocate to state and federal banking authorities responsibility
for factual determinations, 3 requiring degrees of precision varying from such
specific economic indicia of profitable operation 8 4 as retail sales in the area to
such general criteria as "good and sufficient reasons,"8 5 the "general good,"883
the "best interest of the public,"8' 7 and that the bank is "justified." 88 Notwith-
standing these verbal differences, one survey of state banking supervisors re-
vealed that prospects of profitable operations were the key determinants ;89
competition was much less important, influencing a decision only when it would
endanger existing banks DO or counteract a monopolistic market.9 1 Another sur-
vey indicated that an applicant is expected to show potential deposit genera-
tion of $1,000,000 to $3,000,000 during the first three years.92 Usually the
79. See CAL. FINANCIAL CODE ANN. § 362(a); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 5, § 726 (1953) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.03 (Supp. 1960) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 13-905 (Supp. 1958) ; HAwAII
REv. LAWs § 178-16 (1955); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 287.050 (1955); ME. REV. STAT.
ch. 59, § 19-B (Supp. 1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, § 30 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 168, § 78 (1959) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 363.030 (Supp. 1960) ("convenience and needs") ;
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (Supp. 1958);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-11 (1950) (public advantage); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 24; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 707.080(f) (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-306 (1939); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 19-1-9 (1957) ; S.D. CODE § 6.0304 (1939) ("public convenience and neces-
sity") ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-206 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.01(5) (1957); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 13-44 (1959) ("convenience and needs") ; 13 Stat. 102 (1864), as amended,
12 U.S.C. § 27 (1958), 12 C.F.R. § 4.1(b) (1959) ("convenience and needs").
80. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. LAws § 178-16 (1955).
81. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 5160(a) (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.030 (Supp. 1960);
Nrv. REv. STAT. § 659.040 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-5 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-26 (1953). Cf. ALASKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 34-1-196 (Supp. 1958) ; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-19-10 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
82. See CAL. FINANCIAL CODE ANN. § 361(b) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.03(b) (Supp.
1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-905 (Supp. 1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 659.040 (1959); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 45-206 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.01(5) (1957).
83. Stokes, supra note 71.
84. See CAL. FINANCIAL CODE ANN. § 361(c) (3); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-53(7)
(1960); GA. CODE ANN. §13-905 (Supp. 1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5160(a) (1957);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-206 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.01(5) (1957).
85. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-26 (1953).
86. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 336 (1958).
87. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1103.06 (1954) ; cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-57 (Supp.
1960).
88. ORE. REV. STAT. § 707.080 (1959).
89. S. DoC. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 989 (1952).
90. Ibid.
91. Id. at 993.
92. Stokes, supra note 71, at 931 n.41, 938-39; see also Suburban Bank v. Jackson
County State Bank, 330 S.W.2d 183, 187 (1959). The following cases review in detail
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banking agencies arrive at a basis for decision by ex parte investigations ;93
some states, however, require a public hearing.9 Several statutes do not spe-
cifically provide for judicial scrutiny of these administrative determinations,"
but review seems possible if general administrative procedure acts are opera-
tive.9 6 Where review is provided for, it may be by a court,97 a board,9 8 or a
state executive council.99 Standing would seem limited to unsuccessful appli-
cants,100 but competing banks have occasionally obtained review of a charter
authorization. 101 In a few states, review is either explicitly prohibited,'10 2 or is
available only when the banking agency fails to disclose its reasons for denial. 1 3
With the exception of a few statutes providing for a trial de novo rather than
judicial review,1" 4 an agency's factual findings are conclusive. 10 5
the scope of various banking authorities' investigations and the relevance of various
criteria: State Banking Bd. v. McCulloch, 316 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ; Moran
v. State Banking Comm'r, 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W.2d 772 (1948); State v. State Sec.
Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920) ; Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d
722 (1956).
93. S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 990 (1952).
94. Id. at 991; see also HAWAII REv. LAWS § 178-16 (1955) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-
223 to -224 (Supp. 1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, § 78 (1959); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45.04 (Supp. 1960) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 5160(a) (1957) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-02-05
(1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 55; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-1-5 (1957) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 335 (1958).
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 86 (1960).
96. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-208, 27-901 to -913 (1955) ; see also Du Bose v.
Gormley, 189 Ga. 321, 5 S.E.2d 909 (1959) ; Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896
(1942) ; Persons v. Mashburn, 211 Ga. 477, 86 S.E.2d 319 (1955) (review by mandamus).
But see Natick Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 151 N.E.2d 70
(1958). Compare Moran v. State Banking Comm'r, 322 Mich. 230, 248-49, 33 N.W.2d 772,
780 (1948).
97. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.739, 23.754 (1943) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 5160(b) (1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 361.095 (Supp. 1960) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 659.060 (1960) ; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 396, § 8 (1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-92 (1960); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6-32 (1949).
98. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.040 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 24; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 707.150 (1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-26 (1953).
99. IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.12 (1949).
100. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.754 (1943) ("applicants . . . aggrieved"); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 5160(b) (1957) ("prospective incorporators . . . aggrieved").
101. See Application of Millburn-Short Hills Bank, 59 N.J. Super. 470, 158 A.2d 66
(1959) ; Application of State Bank of Plainfield, 61 N.J. Super. 150, 160 A.2d 299 (1960) ;
cf. National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
102. See Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 13-44 (1959); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 726
(1953) (no review of adverse decision).
103. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17: 9A-15 (Supp. 1960); but cf. note 101 supra and
accompanying text. Compare McKinnon v. State Banking Comm'n, 103 N.W.2d 179 (S.D.
1960).
104. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-27 (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 659.060 (1959);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.08.040 (1959).
105. See, e.g., ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 34-1-55 (1958) ; see also Planters Bank
v. Barrott, 239 Miss. 248, 122 So. 2d 256 (1960).
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In reviewing an agency's decision, most courts have affirmed, relying heavily
on the former's expertise.1° 6 Although nearly all charter statutes fail to specify
the relevance of competition, 10 7 a few courts have stressed its importance,10 8
even to the extent of reversing an agency. In Moran v. Nelson,0 9 for example,
the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the State Banking Commissioner to is-
sue a bank charter to a Detroit applicant. In reviewing the area's economic
conditions, the court noted that the six existing banks had consistently been
permitted to accommodate increased demand by establishing new branches."10
Specifically overruling the Commissioner's determination that the term "neces-
sity" in the statute meant "absolute need,""' the court said that adequacy of
existing facilities was not conclusive "2 since the charter statute should be ap-
plied "not to deter competition or foster monopoly, but to guard the public and
public interest against imprudent banking."' 3 Moreover, as the Commissioner
had made no finding that the new bank would be unprofitable, his decision could
not be justified on solvency grounds."14
The Moran decision suggests that banking agencies may be oversolicitous in
protecting existing banks from competition. 1 5 But this result should be avoided
if customers are to have sufficient banking alternatives. Arguably, a public
hearing would provide a control against arbitrary agency action."16 Since the
issue is charter of a new bank, the usual banking agency reason for opposing
public hearings-fear that public disclosure of an existing bank's condition
might cause a run "m-might seem inapplicable. But since existing banks would
106. See, e.g., State v. State Sec. Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920) ; Pue
v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896 (1942) ; Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722
(1956) ; State Banking Bd. v. McCulloch, 316 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
107. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-206 (1955) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.01(5)
(1957).
108. Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722, 725 (1956); Suburban Bank v.
Jackson County State Bank, 330 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Application of
State Bank of Plainfield, 61 N.J. Super. 150, 160 A.2d 299, 305 (1960); Application of
Howard Say. Institution of Newark, 32 N.J. 29, 159 A.2d 113, 124-25 (1960) ; State v.
State Sec. Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759, 760 (1920).
109. 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W.2d 772 (1948).
110. Id. at 241-42, 33 N.W.2d at 777.
111. Ibid.
112. 322 Mich. at 243, 33 N.W.2d at 778. See also Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76
N.W.2d 722, 726 (1956) ; Suburban Bank of Kansas City v. Jackson County State Bank,
330 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
113. 322 Mich. at 243, 33 N.W.2d at 778.
114. Id.,at 246-48, 33 N.W.2d at 779-80.
115. In one state, the banking supervisor must have been recommended by the state
bankers' association; TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-102 (1955). For other indications that bank
administrators may be influenced by the industry, see S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
25-29 (1959) and S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 989-95 (1952). Cf. Commss-
SION ON MONEY & CREDIT, MONEY AND CREDIT 165 (1961).
116. See note 94 supra.
117. See 105 CONG. REc. 8137-38 (1959). Even if the bank's deposits were insured by
the FDIC, a failure caused by a run would injure depositors. Amounts above $10,000 are
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have to expose their borderline financial condition in order to show the detri-
ment of a new bank's entry, the fear of customer reaction may deter such
banks from providing the disclosure essential to the bank supervisor's deter-
mination.
But even if a public hearing is undesirable, bank charter statutes might spe-
cifically require consideration of competition, or at least declare it to be the
preferred banking structure to the extent consistent with bank solvency. 118
Moreover, by requiring that an agency consider other banks only when a pro-
spective entrant might render their failure predictable, these statutes could
minimize the monopolistic effect which limited entry has upon displacing exist-
ing banks. Agency activity could be more effectively policed in most states
either by statutory reference to the economic indicia relevant to predicting an
applicant's profitability and the failure of existing banks," 9 or by requiring
agency promulgation of regulations governing its inquiry. 20 With these
changes, bank charter statutes would foster the number of alternatives neces-
sary for competitive behavior. But it is doubtful that bank entry would signifi-
cantly increase since, except in a few areas,12 ' very few charter applications
have been made in recent years.'2 2 State banking officials have suggested that
impediments are primarily economic, not legal, pointing to low bank stock
prices caused by bad profit prospects, and to the complete networks of finan-
cial institutions in their states.' 23 Where entry is economically attractive, how-
ever, improved charter statutes would facilitate a structure more conducive to
competitive behavior.
This analysis applies with greater force to statutes regulating one type of
branch banking-where branching is accomplished by the creation of new,
rather than the acquisition of existing, banking units. Establishment of branch
banks is subject to administrative approval, and the standards applied are
usually identical or quite similar to those governing bank charter.124 But since
branches appear to cost less to operate than small unit banks, 2 5 and conse-
quently require less capital 126 and fewer deposits 127 for profitable operation,
not insured, 68 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1957), and even if the funds are
covered by insurance, the process of claim filing, 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (f)
(1958), 12 C.F.R. § 305.1 (1959), may impair their availability for some time.
118. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1632, § 71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) ("It is held to be
in the public interest that competition prevail in the banking system ....
119. See note 84 sufpra.
120. Cf. Berle, Banking Under the Anti-trust Laws, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 589, 597-98
(1949).
121. S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 996 (1952) (statement of J.M. Falk-
ner of Texas).
122. Id. at 995.
123. Ibid.
124. Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for New Banks and
Branches, 74 BANKING L.J. 921, 926-27 (1957) ; see also Upper Darby Nat'l Bank v. Myers,
386 Pa. 12, 124 A.2d 116 (1956).
125. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 102-05 (1954).
126. CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 277 (1942).
127. See note 124 -vipra.
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branch establishment is possible in less populous or more heavily banked areas
where unit bank charter would be precluded. 128 Thus, in addition to adopting
the standard of competition suggested for bank charter approval, statutes and
administrative bodies should take into account that the lower operating costs
of branch banking may increase consumer alternatives significantly.
129
Several states prohibit branch banking 13 0 or limit the location of a branch
to the county,131 county and contiguous counties, 132 or a zone surrounding its
home office.133 Apart from subjective arguments praising the virtue of local
control,' 3 4 most critics find branch banking objectionable because it increases
concentration, thereby decreasing competition, either by absorbing independent
banks or by driving such banks out of business. 135 Theoretically, lower cost
branch banks could force the failure of higher cost unit banks without resort
to predatory tactics.' 36 In practice, however, this has not occurred.'37 While
this behavior indicates that branch banks have not benefited consumers by re-
ducing prices, these branches nevertheless provide additional credit sources for
marginal risk borrowers 138 in addition to competing in services. Moreover,
while absorption by merger has been the primary instrument of branch bank
growth,139 outright prohibitions or geographic limitations go too far because
128. ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 125, at 105 n.54; Stokes, supra note 124, at 927;
CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 126, at 279-83.
129. CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 126, at 279-83. See also CoMMISSION
ON MONEY & CREDIT, op. cit. supra note 115, at 165.
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.06 (Supp. 1960) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16Y2, § 106 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (Supp. 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.34 (1946) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 5-1028 (1957) ; NEB. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 8-1,105
(1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 461 (Supp. 1960) ; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 16, TEX.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 342-903 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3131 (1955); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 221.04(f) (Supp. 1961).
131. IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-1707 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19 (Supp.
1960) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-211 (1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 6-26 (Supp. 1960).
132. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-319 (1957) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 528.51 (Supp. 1960);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 19-c (Supp. 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-17 (1954);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-14 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1103.09 (1954).
133. See HAWAII REv. LAWS § 178-39 (Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-17
(1954).
134. COLLINS, THE BRANCH BANKING QUESTION 9 (1926); CHAPMAN & WESTER-
=IED, op. cit. supra note 126, at 216-28.
135. COLLINS, op. cit. mipra note 134, at 8-9; see also Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v.
Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 454-55, 130 A2d 686, 691 (1957) (when large bank acquires small
bank as branch "a pygmy has become a giant ... and the effect ... is not substantially
different from what would occur if a giant were established as a branch where no pygmy
had theretofore existed.").
136. ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 125, at 107.
137. Id. at 207-08, 216. See also COMMISSION ON MONEY & CRnrr, op. cit. supra note
115, at 165.
138. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
139. Several branching statutes require or prefer this method of growth, presumably
for solvency reasons: substitution of a branch for a bank cannot overbank an area. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 36-59 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-1001 (Supp. 1961); Ky. Rnv. STAT,
19621
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they arbitrarily deny the public the increased alternatives in areas where a bank
has no other branches. Merger statutes, discussed in succeeding sections, could
preserve competition more effectively by outlawing only the alternative-reduc-
ing transactions which affect competition.
CONCENTRATION
Banking concentration-decreasing the number of independent alterna-
tives 140 -may be effected by three means: liquidation, holding company ac-
quisition, and merger. Although liquidation reduced the bank population by
almost 50 per cent in the 1920's and 1930's,141 few banks have left the industry
by this means in recent years.1 42 Banking concentration through the other two
means, however, has increased markedly.143 The succeeding sections attempt
to describe and evaluate the laws governing these transactions.
The Statutes
Bank Holding Companies
A bank holding company is a business unit which holds the controlling stock
interests of commercial banks. 44 By stock acquisition of competing banks, a
single company can eliminate independence of action, thereby increasing bank-
ing concentration. 45 While the banking subsidiaries remain independently
chartered and possess a degree of autonomy,146 holding companies exercise
continued control over the more important managerial decisions such as pro-
motion of senior officers.' 47 In 1957, 44 registered holding companies controlled
417 unit banks, having 851 branches. 48 These companies accounted for 5.9
per cent of all banking offices and 7.5 per cent of all deposits. 149
In 1956, Congress responded to a seventeen year effort '"o to bring bank
holding company operation and expansion under control. The federal statute '5 '
provides for holding company registration 152 and examination,'5 3 and pro-
ANN. § 287.180 (1955) ; MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, § 5 (1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§ 819-204.1 (Supp. 1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1959) ; WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 30.40.020 (1955). One state offers the alternative of gaining the consent of all exist-
ing banks in the area in which a branch is sought to be located; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-
1001 (Supp. 1961).
140. CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION OF BANKING 5 (1934).
141. GOLDSCHIIDT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN BANKING 206 (1933).
142. Between 1950 and 1959 only 98 banks have discontinued business. H.R. REP. No.
1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960).
143. See NADLER & BOGEN, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY 20, chart III (1960).
144. NADLER & BOGEN, op. cit. supra note 143, at 5, 13 (1959).
145. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
146. NADLER & BOGEN, op. cit. supra note 143, at 5.
147. Id. at 22-23.
148. Id. at 14.
149. Ibid.
150. For review of previous bills see S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1955).
151. 70 Stat. 133-39 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1958).
152. 70 Stat. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1958).
153. 70 Stat. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1958).
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scribes certain self-dealing transactions between holding companies and their
subsidiaries. 15 4 It requires divestiture of non-banking interests 155 and Federal
Reserve Board approval of future banking acquisitions and holding company
mergers.'r, In granting or denying approval of acquisitions or mergers, the
Board is to take into consideration the following factors:
(1) The financial history and conditions of the company or companies
and the banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their
management; (4) the convenience, needs, and welfare of the communities
and the area concerned; and (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisi-
tion or merger or consolidation would be to expand the size or extent of
the bank holding company system involved beyond limits consistent with
adequate and sound banking, the public interest, and the preservation of
competition in the field of banking.157
The Board must request recommendations from the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency on the applications for acquisitions of national banks, or from the appro-
priate state banking authorities for state bank acquisitions. 158 If such recom-
mendations oppose approval, the Board must hold a public hearing on the
application.159 Aggrieved parties may obtain judicial review of any Board de-
cision. 100
A paucity of legislative history discussing the criteria governing holding
company acquisitions 161 has left the Board with little guidance in its deter-
minations. As a result the sole source of authoritative interpretation of these
vague provisions is the Board's forty-six decisions.162
The first three criteria-financial history and condition, prospects, and char-
acter of management-were included to require a solvency evaluation of both
the applicant company and the acquisition. 163 The statute requires the Board
to compare the financial condition of the applicant with that of the proposed
acquisition to determine whether the acquisition would jeopardize "the safety
of the depositor's funds."'1 This procedure may accomplish the rescue of fail-
ing banks by solvent holding companies, and prevent acquisition of healthy
banks by unsound holding company systems. Thus far, the Board has apparent-
154. 70 Stat. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1845 (1958).
155. 70 Stat: 135 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1958).
156. 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1958).
157. 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1958).
158. 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1958).
159. Ibid.
160. 70 Stat. 138 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1848 (Supp. 1960).
161. Most Congressional debate centered on the problem of divestment of non-banking
assets. Although the Senate report intimates that concern over undue holding company
concentration prompted the bill, S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955), only
three sentences are devoted to the competitive provisions; and the original House bill, H.R.
6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), contained no such provision.
162. These decisions are reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
163. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 10 (1955).
164. Ibid.
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ly had little opportunity to effect these objectives; in nearly every case it has
found the condition, prospects, and management of both the holding company
and the proposed acquisition "satisfactory," indicating that the transaction
would have no appreciable effect on deposit safety. 165 In one case, however, the
Board found that the proposed acquisition had a management succession prob-
lem which might imperil the bank's solvency when its senior officers retired.l
The Board approved the acquisition even though the transaction substantially
increased the holding company's share of deposits and banking offices in the
area. On occasion, the Board has mentioned that a transaction would enable a
bank to obtain additional capital more easily, 167 but in no case have solvency
considerations demonstrated need for such capital.
Since a holding company may simply possess the stock of an acquisition, it
would seem that the Board could rarely justify an acquisition on the basis of
the fourth factor--"the convenience, needs and welfare of the . . . area con-
cerned." Holding companies often promise to shower a proposed acquisition
with such benefits as improved management, 1 8 but they are under no obliga-
tion to follow through.'0 9 In a surprising number of cases, however, the Board
has approved acquisitions on the basis of such promises, even when some com-
petition would be eliminated. The importance attributed to the "convenience,
needs and welfare" factor has varied with the fact situations. Where, for ex-
ample, the proposed acquisitions were chartered banks not yet in operation
planning to do business in areas having no immediate banking facilities, the
Board has invariably approved the acquisition as a means of providing the
area with needed banking services.170 But where banking facilities were avail-
able and the holding company had another subsidiary in the area, the acquisition
of a bank not yet in operation has been disapproved because it would have an
adverse effect on competition in the area.171 The Board has given considerable
weight to promises of increased loan limits to individual borrowers 172 and
165. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Trust Co., 46 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 14 (1960).
See also First Virginia Corp., 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1036 (1961).
166. Northwest Bancorporation, 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 147, 148-49 (1959).
167. First Virginia Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 8, 9 (1959); Marine Corp., 45
FED. RESERVE BULL. 1132, 1133 (1959) ; Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 45 FED. RESERVE
BuLL. 1133, 1135 (1959); Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc., 47 FED. RESERVE BuuL.
760, 761 (1961).
168. First Bank Stock Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 486 (1960).
169. To date no Board orders have been conditional. For an indication of the range
of differences in holding-subsidiary relations which may result, see NADLER & BOGEN, THE
BANx HoLD ING COMPANY 24-29 (1959).
170. Atlantic Nat'l Bank and Atl. Trust Co., 45 FED. RESERVE BUL.L. 1353 (1959);
First Wisconsin Bankshares Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 266 (1959) ; Marine Corp., 46
FED. RESERVE BuLL. 1338 (1960) ; Atlantic Nat'l Bank and At. Trust Co., 47 FED. RESERVE
BuLL. 917 (1961).
171. First Bank Stock Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 1061 (1958). See also Northwest
Bancorporation, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 919 (1961) (proposed state bank which would
be independent preferred).
172. Baystate Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 13 (1958). The amount lent to any one
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offers of state-wide banking services, 173 notwithstanding its recognition that
these benefits could be achieved by smaller banks through their correspondent
banks.17 4 To a lesser extent, the Board has been impressed with promises to
offer a wider range of banking services, 76 to improve management, 176 and to
provide additional capital to keep pace with the growth of the area served. 177
In applying the fifth criterion-whether the effect of an acquisition "would
be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved
beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest
and the preservation of competition in the field of banking"-the Board has
touched on "adequate and sound banking," ignored "the public interest" as an
independent consideration, and intensively examined "the preservation of com-
petition." Since the statute's first three criteria presumably test the solvency
of the holding company and the acquisition, the "adequate and sound banking"
factor has been construed to mean the transaction's effects on other banks. A
finding that the effects upon these banks would be "adverse" has prompted
disapproval of the acquisition, although it is unclear what degree of impairment
is required. 178 The Board has indicated that "the public interest" is not itself
a separate consideration.179 If, after a weighing of all the other factors, the
Board's decision is consistent with a reasonable resolution thereof, it is per-
force in the public interest.'80
In considering "preservation of competition," the Board has analyzed both
the number of banks in different markets and the extent to which these banks
compete. To evaluate banking structure, changes in concentration which may
be caused by the proposed acquisition are first determined. The Board ex-
amines four markets surrounding the proposed acquisition: the state, the county
and contiguous counties, the county itself, and a zone, called the primary ser-
vice area, from which 75 per cent of the bank's deposits are derived.' 8' Three
measures of concentration are used: the number of banking offices, including
branches or banks in a holding company system ;182 the amount of individual,
partnership and corporation deposits ;183 and the amount of all deposits. 84 Any
borrower is usually limited to a fixed per cent of the bank's capital; see, e.g., 34 Stat. 451
(1918), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1958) (10% of capital for national banks).
173. Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 134, 137 (1959).
174. Id. at 137; Marine Corp., 44 FED. RESERvE BuLL. 1281, 1283 (1958).
175. New Hampshire Bankshares, Inc., 44 FD. RESERVE BuLL. 432 (1958); First
Security Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 258 (1959) ; Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE
BULL. 134, 137-38 (1959).
176. Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 134, 136 (1959).
177. See note 167 mipra.
178. Wisconsin Bankshares, 44 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 15, 16 (1958).
179. F.rstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 134, 138-39 (1959) ; First New York
Corp., 44 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 902, 912.
180. Ibid.
181. See, e.g., Marine Midland Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 1228 (1960).
182. See New Hampshire Bankshares, Inc., 44 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 432 (1958).
183. See, e.g., Marine Corp., 44 FuD. RESERV BuLL. 1283 (1958).
184. See note 181 mipra.
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increase in a concentration measure in a market is noted, but apparently the
Board has drawn no outcome-determinative conclusions from this data. 8 5
Of more importance is the Board consideration given the number of alter-
native banking sources that would remain after the acquisition. Types of alter-
natives have been limited to commercial banks and mutual savings banks,5 0
but despite close functional similarities, 18 7 savings and loan associations have
been expressly disregarded on the ground that Congress did not intend their
inclusion "in the banking field."' 5 Although increased concentration may de-
crease competition,18 9 applications have been approved if the consumer still
can choose among a reasonable number of alternatives. 19  Even where the
alternatives would have been substantially reduced, but the acquisition was to
be merged with other banks of a large holding company in an area having a
dominant bank, the Board approved on the theory that the transaction would
enable the applicant to offer a wider range of services to compete with the
dominant bank.'91
In addition to its structural analysis, the Board undertakes an analysis of
industry behavior to ascertain the extent to which the proposed acquisition
presently competes with banks already held by the applicant. On occasion, the
Board has studied the holding company's history of acquisitions to discern an
anticompetitive motive. 192 But the Board's primary behavioral index has been
the overlap of primary service areas, 193 presumably because the transaction
will eliminate one of the banking alternatives in these areas. 94 The amount of
deposits and the number of accounts that each bank derives from the overlap-
ping area are expressed as a percentage of their total deposits and accounts.' 9 r
As with its structural analysis, the Board deems crucial the number of remain-
ing alternatives. Where consumers would have had few alternatives other than
applicant's bank, the transaction was disapproved even though applicant's bank
185. See, e.g., Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 159 (1961).
186. See Baystate Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 13 (1958) ; 46 FED. RESERVE: BULL.
1230 (1960).
187. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
188. First Bank Stock Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 486, 493 (1960); Northwest
Bancorporation, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 408, 410 (1961).
189. See, e.g., Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 159 (1961).
190. Marine Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1281, 1284 (1958) ; Firstamerica Corp., 45
FED. RESERVE BULL. 134, 140 (1959); Marine Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1132, 1133
(1959) ; Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1133 (1959) ; Atlantic
Nat'l Bank and Atl. Trust Co., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1353 (1959) ; First Virginia Corp.,
46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 617 (1960); Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 47 FED. RESERVE
BULL. 159 (1961) ; Marine Corp., 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1179, 1181 (1961).
191. Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 134, 137-38 (1959). See also Marine
Corp., 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1179 (1961), reversing stand on acquire-to-compete argu-
ment in id. at 766.
192. BancOhio Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1389 (1958).
193. See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 134, 138 (1959).
195. See, e.g., Baystate Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1230 (1960).
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derived only 15 per cent of its deposits from the proposed acquisition's primary
service area.1 6 On the other hand, when there was complete primary service
area overlap, but several alternatives remained available, the application was
approved.'1 7 In addition, where the proposed acquisition contemplated branch
banking, the Board, although granting the application, viewed overlap of the
primary service areas of applicant's banks with those of the proposed branch
banks as threatening foreclosure of potential competition. 98 But the Board has
disregarded primary service area overlap when the proposed acquisition and
the applicant's presently held banks appear to have specialized in separate bank-
ing fields.'00
Board application of each statutory criterion is preliminary to a more per-
plexing task-determining the relative importance of the criteria. The statute
indicates no appropriate net result in cases where some criteria are favorable
to the transaction, others are unfavorable, and still others are neutral. Nor did
Congress indicate a presumption for or against holding company expansion.200
In close cases, a majority of the Board has generally approved acquisitions, 2 1'
to the dismay of certain members.20 2 But in one major case the Board refused
to approve the joinder of a large suburban bank and a large city bank though
the first three criteria were found neutral, the fourth slightly favorable and the
fifth slightly unfavorable.2 03 The Board assumed that the transaction would
effect a decrease in consumer alternatives although there was no evidence re-
garding consumer behavior in that area.
2 °4
To restrict bank holding companies further, seven states have supplemented
the federal statute. While New York's act is similar to the federal statute,205
the other states prohibit any effort to form a holding company and virtually
freeze expansion of existing companies.206 Although preservation of banking
competition has been relied upon to justify such statutes, 20 7 the same states
196. First Bank Stock Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 486, 491-92 (1960). See also
Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc., 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 760 (1961).
197. Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 159, 161 (1961). See
also Northwest Bancorporation, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 408 (1961). But see BancOhio
Corp., 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 412 (1961) (no attention to remaining alternatives).
198. Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 134, 139-40 (1959). See also North-
west Bancorporation, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 408 (1961).
199. Ibid.; Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 159, 161 (1961).
200. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955).
201. See, e.g., Marine Midland Corp., 46 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1228 (1960).
202. Bank Stock Corp. of Milwaukee, 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1133, 1136 (1959) (Vice
Chairman Balderston and Governor Robertson, dissenting).
203. First New York Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 902 (1958).
204. Ibid.
205. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 141-47.
206. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16Y2, §§ 71-73 (Supp. 1960) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-1814-16
(Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-504-7 (Supp. 1959); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
167A, §§ 1-7 (1959) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 5235 (1957).
207. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1632, § 71 (Supp. 1960) ; Braeburn Sec. Corp. v. Smith,
15 Ill. 2d 55, 62, 153 N.E.2d 806, appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 311 (1959).
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which paralyze holding company growth also restrict the increased competition
which branch banking might provide.20 Indeed, it is likely that the holding
company laws are merely an attempt to prevent circumvention of branching
laws 208 because, if preservation of competition were truly the goal it would be
difficult to justify total prohibition of bank holding companies. While acquisi-
tion of competitors by the same company would lessen competition, acquisition
of non-competing banks with a resulting improvement in management or ser-
vices might increase competition with other banks in the area.
Mergers
Broadly defined, the term bank merger includes any exchange or purchase
of assets or stock among two or more banks to create a single unit.210 During
the financial crisis of the 1930's this device was often used to rescue failing
banks.211 But even in the more prosperous 1950's, banks continued to merge,
causing a decrease in bank population.212 No single motive predominated in
this movement. The desire of larger banks to acquire deposits, branches, or
managerial talent, to, increase their lending limits, to eliminate a competitor or
to increase the efficiency of existing resources were among the more important
motives.213 In addition, the depressed market for bank stocks, often selling for
less than book value, encouraged mergers.214 Since acquired banks' assets,
mostly short term loans and government bonds, are easily liquidated, acquir-
ing banks at no cost to themselves could offer a price as high as net asset value
and induce stockholders to sell because they would receive more than the market
value.215 By eliminating at least one banking alternative, these transactions
may lessen competition.
In 1960, Congress amended the bank merger provisions of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Act. This amendment 21 3 allocates merger control
of federally insured banks to federal bank supervisory agencies on the theory
208. See notes 124 to 139 supra and accompanying text.
209. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16%, § 71 (Supp. 1960) (purpose of act to protect unit
banks).
210. See FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuIsmIoNs ch. IV (1955).
211. Hearings on the Regulation of Bank Mergers Before a Subcomninittee of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]; CHAPMXAN, CONCENTRATION OF BANXING 81-84 (1934).
212. Between 1950 and 1959, 1503 banks, 10% of the previous total, have been absorbed
by merger, 887 new banks have been chartered and 98 others have discontinued business
resulting in a net decrease of 714. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960) ; see
also Alhadeff, Recent Bank Mergers, 69 Q.J. EcoN. 503 (1955).
213. House Hearings 82; Smith, New York Banking's Troubled Giants, Fortune,
April, 1959, p. 115.
214. Id. at 214; Hearings on Corporate Mergers Before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust ail Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
727 (1955) ; N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1950, § 3 (Business), p. 1, col. 7.
215. Ibid.
216. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1960).
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that banking's peculiar nature--especially the need for solvency for the protec-
tion of depositors-merits specialized supervision.217 Prior to the consumma-
tion of any merger transaction, the statute requires written approval by the
appropriate federal banking agency-the Comptroller of the Currency for re-
sulting national banks, the Federal Reserve Board for resulting state member
banks, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for resulting
insured state banks which are not members of the federal reserve system.
Except in emergencies, notice of impending mergers must be published in local
newspapers before an agency may act; and the agencies' decisions must be
related to Congress annually. In evaluating merger applications, the appropriate
agency is to consider
the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, the ade-
quacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general
character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community
to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with
the purposes of this [Act] .... [T]he appropriate agency shall also take
into consideration the effect of the transaction on competition (including
any tendency toward monopoly), and shall not approve the transaction
unless, after considering all of such factors, it finds the transaction to be
in the public interest.218
Except in emergencies, the appropriate agency is to request an advisory opinion
on "the competitive factors involved" from the Attorney General, presumably
expert in evaluating competitive behavior. To insure uniformity of decision,
the appropriate agency must secure similar advisory opinions from the two
other banking agencies.
The first five criteria which an agency must consider-financial history and
condition, capital, future earnings, character of management, convenience and
needs of the community-are derived almost verbatim 219 from the bank insur-
ability provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act.220 In that
context, these criteria presumably indicate the degree of a bank's solvency,
enabling the FDIC to insure only solvent banks convenient and necessary to
a community.2 21 It is arguable, therefore, that by making these criteria appli-
cable to bank mergers Congress directed the appropriate agency to evaluate
the solvency of the absorbed banks. If failure of the merging bank were im-
minent, merger into a solvent bank would be approved; but if all the merging
banks were solvent, the agency would then have to ascertain any adverse effect
on competition, relying heavily on the opinion of the Attorney General. This
interpretation accords with the gloss of the failing business doctrine on the
merger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 2 Since failing businesses
217. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1959).
218. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1960).
219. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
220. 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1958).
221. See S. REP. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
222. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
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would in the natural course of events cease to compete, competition would not
be maintained by disallowance of merger into stronger firms. Notwithstanding
apparent violation of the anti-merger provisions of section 7, such mergers are
permitted in order to effect significant saving of economic resources.223 Con-
sistent with this interpretation, Congress allocated responsibility for ascertain-
ing imminent bank failure to agencies presumably expert in evaluating bank
solvency. 224 Thus interpreted, the new statute presumes a general pattern of
competition, but excludes the situation of the failing or near-failing bank in the
interest of the need for solvency in the banking system.
Congress undoubtedly favored the merger of failing banks into stronger in-
stitutions. The Senate and House committee reports indicate four situations,
all likely to induce bank failure, where competitive considerations are to be
disregarded and merger permitted.2 25 In explaining the bill to the Senate, its
sponsor indicated that the first five criteria were directed at protecting deposi-
tors,22 6 intimating that his committee had included them to exclude the situa-
tion of bank failure. The House committee report and the House sponsor's
explanation direct that these criteria be applied to "each of the banks in-
volved, ' '227 apparently not to the resulting bank, indicating concern with sol-
vency of the merging banks, not prediction of the resulting bank's financial
prospects.
It is doubtful, however, that Congress considered imminent bank failure the
only situation where merger would maintain a competitive structure. Since the
statutory criteria were not specified as exceptions to a general principle of
competition, Congress seems to have intended that equal weight should be given
to each factor. Another Senate sponsor explained: "All of these . . . factors
must be... weighed together, and the merger should be approved only if, after
consideration of all these factors, the net result is in favor of the proposal.
'228
Consistent with this view, the Senate rejected an amendment proscribing
mergers which lessen competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly
unless failure or near failure of a merging bank be shown,229 because it feared
that other exigencies might arise.230 Moreover, it is doubtful that Congress'
223. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) ; see also Hearings on Pro-
posed Financial Institutions Act Before House Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 130-31 (1957) ; Hearings on Proposed Financial Institutions Act Before
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1014 (1957).
224. In their day-to-day operations all three agencies examine the financial condition
of banks; 62 Stat. 1163 (1948), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 481 (Supp. 1960) (Comptroller
of the Currency) ; 38 Stat. 261 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1958) (Federal
Reserve Board) ; 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (1958) (FDIC).
225. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1959) ; H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960).
226. 105 CONG. REc. 8076 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
227. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960); 106 CONG. REc. 7257-58
(1960) (remarks of Congressman Brown).
228. 106 CONG. REc. 9712 (1960) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
229. 105 CONG. REc. 8125-39 (1959).
230. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 8129 (1959) (remarks of Senator Javits).
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only concern was with failing banks, since there is some indication that it did
not intend that application of the criteria be limited solely to merging banks.
The language of the FDIC statute requiring application of the criteria to result-
ing banks has not been expressly altered by its 1960 amendment.2"' And in
contrast to the House committee report on the 1960 amendment, which requires
focus on "each of the banks involved," the Senate report requires considera-
tion of "the bank." 232 If the Senate report language refers to the resulting
bank, the condition of the merging banks would be irrelevant and the statutory
inquiry would be limited to forecasting the resulting bank's solvency. Further-
more, the banking criteria did not originate in the FDIC statute; they were
carried over from the language of the statute governing charter of national
banks.233 Adoption of the chartering statute criteria, therefore, may indicate
that Congress intended to focus only on a single bank, the resulting bank, as if
it were a newly chartered bank.
But Congress probably intended the following procedure: appraisal of the
solvency of the merging banks, prediction of the resulting bank's solvency,
determination of any solvency benefits or risks of a merger, and balancing this
result against any effect upon competition or convenience to arrive at a final
decision. This procedure would constitute a test which is compatible with the
"each of the banks involved" language of the House report because of its ex-
amination of the merging banks, and would also require consideration of the
resulting bank as intended by the "the bank" language in the Senate report.2 34 It
accords with the requirement that "all of these ... factors must be ... weighed
together." 235 And it clearly provides for the situation of the failing or near-
failing bank, since an increase in solvency through merger would seem to out-
weigh a decrease in competition.
In their first year applying the statute, the banking agencies appear to have
followed this interpretation.23 6 In one case (out of ninety-four) failure of a
merging bank was imminent.2 3 7 In many other situations, however, all three
agencies have stressed increased solvency as a factor to be weighed against de-
creased competition even though they made no finding that the merging banks'
failure was imminent or probable. Specifically, the agencies have viewed merg-
ers as desirable remedies for banks having management succession problems 23 8
231. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1959).
232. Id. at 22.
233. S. REP. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
234. See notes 227 and 232 supra.
235. See note 228 supra.
236. The reports of banking agency merger approvals are found in their Annual Re-
ports to Congress, see note 216 supra and accompanying text: 1960 COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY ANNUAL REPORT 52-106 [hereinafter cited as CoMP. CuRR. REP.]; 1960 BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEm ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter cited as
FRB REP.]; 1960 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 112-25
[hereinafter cited as FDIC REP.].
237. FDIC REP. No. 2.
238. Comp. CuRR. REP. Cas. Nos. 13, 23, 43, 44, 56; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 14, 15, 17;
FDIC REP. Gas. No. 9.
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or for banks in areas which are declining,239 overbanked, 240 or have one major
industry.241 In addition, the agencies have been favorably impressed by allega-
tions that capital increases 242 or "management depth"243 would result from
merger. Thus, the rule emerges both from legislative history and from agency
application that even if the merging banks are reasonably solvent, the resulting
bank may conceivably be so much more solvent as to outweigh a decrease in
competition. 24
4
Moreover, Congress intended that the fifth factor-fulfillment of a commu-
nity need or increased convenience-might in certain cases outweigh the elim-
ination of some competition. Of primary concern was legitimization of mergers
for the purpose of increasing loan limits to individual borrowers ;24-5 providing
a wider range of banking services to the community was also a relevant con-
sideration.246 In approving mergers, the agencies have invariably relied, at
least in part, on improved services as justifying decreased competition.2 47 In
many situations the agencies have held that the needs of expanding areas merit
the higher loan limits 2 48 and increased loanable funds 249 which mergers may
provide. Promises to provide a wider range of services,250 more "aggressive
management," 25 1 or "more efficient operating services" 25 2 have been additional
justifications.
Not only may solvency and service considerations outweigh decreased com-
petition and justify merger approval, but Congress has apparently defined
competition to include the merger-to-compete argument. Likening banking to
the railroad industry which, as a regulated public utility, is subject to a less
stringent competitive standard, the bill's sponsors asserted that banks too merit
a modified competitive requirement, 253 specifically validating the merger-to-
compete argument.254 Since large banks lend on a national or regional scale, a
239. Comp. CuR. REP. Cas. No. 16.
240. Comp. CuRa. REP. Cas. No. 7.
241. See Comp. CuRR. REP. Cas. No. 51.
242. Comp. CuRa. REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 36, 41; FDIC REP. Cas. No. 15.
243. Comp. CuRa. REP. Gas. No. 1.
244. Cf. notes 165-67 supra and accompanying text.
245. See 105 CoNG. REc. 7827 (1959).
246. Ibid.; see also 106 CONG. REc. 9712-13 (1960).
247. Comp. CuRa. REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36,
37, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 54, 56; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16;
FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21.
248. Comp. CuRa. REP. Cas. Nos. 12, 19, 43; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 8, 14, 15, 21.
249. Comp. CuRa. REP. Gas. Nos. 15, 19, 30, 44, 46, 47, 49.
250. See Comp. Cura. REP. Cas. No. 49.
251. FRB REP. Cas. No. 11; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 19, 21.
252. FDIC REP. Cas. No. 12; apparently the Comptroller of the Currency has em-
phasized increased solvency rather than better service as a result of increased efficiency,
Comp. CuRa. REP. Cas. Nos. 20, 22. These seem to be the only cases where economies of
scale have been considered.
253. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1959).
254. Id. at 23; 105 CONG. REc. 8143 (1959) (statement of Senator Fulbright) ; 106
CONG. REc. 9712-13 (1960) (explanation by Senator Robertson).
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market not accessible to small or medium-sized banks, merger of the latter
would appear justified because entry of a new bank may render these larger
markets more competitive. It is possible, of course, that a banking agency may
consider the reduction in competition between the merging banks as more im-
portant than an increase in competition in the resulting bank's contemplated
market. But in approving mergers of small banks,25 the banking agencies have
apparently disregarded existing competition between merging banks if what
they consider a sufficient number of other banking alternatives remain.256
State regulation of bank mergers-which exists in all but three states 257o__
usually provides for administrative approval of such transactions to protect
stockholders, depositors, and other creditors. 258 Under these statutes state
banking authorities seem to approve merger applications readily. 259 Some state
authorities must find the merger to be in the public interest 2 60 but there are
no indications that these provisions are aimed at the preservation of competi-
tion.201 In 1960, however, New York enacted a new bank merger statute which
follows the federal statute in requiring administrative consideration of com-
petition.202
An Appraisal
Despite the four year period separating their enactments, the federal holding
company and merger statutes manifest a uniform approach to the problem of
banking concentration. The criteria governing increased concentration-sol-
vency, convenience and competition-and the process of weighing each against
the others are similar in both statutes. 263 Both allocate decision-making respon-
sibility to banking agencies, 264 and available evidence indicates that these
agencies have applied the criteria of each statute in a uniform manner. For
255. Corn'. CuRR. REP. Cas. Nos. 2, 7, 19, 29, 37, 39, 42, 44, 55; FRB RaP. Cas. Nos.
2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17; FDIC RaP. Cas. Nos. 3, 6, 8, 14, 16. Apparently, the
Attorney General has accepted this argument, see ComP. CUGR. REP. Cas. Nos. 10, 42; cf.
id. at Cas. Nos. 23 & 34 (resulting bank so large that smaller banks may have difficulty
competing).
256. See ComP. CuR. REP. Cas. No. 2; FRB RP. Cas. Nos. 5, 13.
257. Alaska, Louisiana, and Rhode Island have no such legislation.
258. For a compilation of state bank merger statutes, see Hearings on the Regulation
of Bank Mergers Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 183-200 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
259. 6S6 requests were granted between 1950 and 1959, House Hearings 19; see also
Senate Hearings 37.
260. Senate Hearings 183.
261. Indeed, when competition is mentioned in the statute, it refers to possible adverse
effects of competition on existing banks; see GA. COnE ANN. §§ 13-1305, 1323 (1936) ; see
also Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 325, 106 A.2d 416, 423 (1954).
262. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 601-6 ("whether such merger . . . may result in such a
lessening of competition as to be injurious to the interest of the public or tend toward
monopoly").
263. Compare note 151 supra with note 216 supra.
264. Compare note 156 supra with note 217 supra.
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example, the Federal Reserve Board has deemed relevant such considerations
as increased service,265 management succession, 260 and merger-to-compete 207
arguments in both holding company and merger cases. This high degree of
uniformity between the two statutes makes possible simultaneous appraisal.
A problem arising under both statutes concerns the extent to which increased
bank solvency resulting from holding company acquisition or from merger
should outweigh decreased competition. Even in the case of the failing bank,
where rescue by merger or holding company acquisition is clearly preferable
to insolvency, competitive considerations should be relevant. Available alter-
natives may be preserved by favoring acquisitions by a holding company
owning no banks in the area or by mergers with non-competing banks; in con-
trast, merger with competing banks will pro tanto reduce alternatives. More-
over, attaching importance to increased solvency when bank failure is not im-
minent gives an administrative agency unwarranted discretion. Since in only
one case has failure been imminent,268 the broad solvency criteria of the stat-
utes should not permit the agencies to overlook solutions to the problem more
consistent with preserving alternatives. Banking agency treatment of manage-
ment succession problems provides a good example. The agencies have ap-
proved nine mergers and one holding company acquisition on the theory that,
since no qualified personnel were available to replace retiring officers, the
merged or acquired banks' solvency might be impaired at some future time.2 0
Since in three cases the transactions significantly decreased alternatives,2 70 a
bank should at least be required to demonstrate to the agency that it has ex-
ercised due diligence in attempting to obtain qualified personnel. And good
faith should be required of the acquiring or absorbing bank, so that it may not
induce a management succession problem by pirating officers of a bank that it
seeks to acquire. If due diligence and good faith are shown, acquisition of banks
with management succession problems by non-competing holding companies
or merger with non-competing banks is preferable to mergers or acquisitions
which absorb one competitor into another.
Banking agencies might effect these policies if the present treatment of sol-
vency considerations were abandoned and the following procedure adopted. If
a banking agency determines that failure is imminent 271 and that rescue is
available by acquisition or by merger, it should approve such a transaction,
giving preference to a non-competing holding company or bank. But if failure
is not imminent, though probable at some future time, as in the case of man-
agement succession or inadequate capital, the agency should order the bank to
265. Compare notes 170-77 supra with note 247 supra.
266. Compare note 166 supra with note 238 supra.
267. Compare note 191 supra with note 255 supra.
268. See note 237 supra.
269. See note 266 supra.
270. Comp. CuR. REP,. Cas. Nos. 23, 44; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 14.
271. Banking agencies seem particularly well-fitted for this task; see H.R. REP. No.
1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1960).
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work out its difficulties, if that is possible, allowing a period for remedial
action set to expire before failure is likely to occur. During this period, for
example, the bank might try to obtain additional personnel or capital. If at the
end of the period the situation has not been corrected, or if the difficulties are
without the bank's control, the agency should permit the bank to be sold, but
only under its supervision. 272 Since a public auction would notify the bank's
depositors of its difficulties and might prompt a run, that method of sale seems
inappropriate. Alternatively, the agency could inform management that it can
sell the bank because merger or acquisition would make the bank both more
secure and, therefore, more valuable, and would avoid losses accompanying
liquidation. Management would be directed to negotiate with all prospective
buyers, and submit the resulting proposals to the agency. Since competitors of
the faltering bank may offer inflated terms for its stock in anticipation of mo-
nopoly profits, 27 3 the agency should have authority to veto such proposals to
preserve alternatives if other bids are satisfactory. Approved proposals would
be submitted to the bank's shareholders whose consent would probably follow
because, not only would they be unlikely to find more favorable outlets for
their stock, but their refusal would inevitably render their shares in the ulti-
mately insolvent bank worthless. If a bank's difficulties are due to its own
shortcomings, threat of a supervised sale would encourage diligent effort by
the bank to improve its financial condition and hence to continue as an alter-
native credit source, and, even if the bank were sold under agency order, the
agency's preference for non-competing buyers would help keep the bank in-
dependent of competitors' control.
Both statutes provide that considerations relating to the convenience and
needs of the community may outweigh predicted decreases in competition. 274 In-
deed, improved banking service has been used most frequently by the banking
agencies to justify increased concentration.2 75
Apparently, the agencies' rationale has been that economies of scale permit
larger banks to provide certain important services.2 76 But these services can
generally be offered by small or medium-sized banks through their corre-
spondents.2 77 The case of the large loan limit, the most frequently mentioned
service attribute of large banks,2 7 8 is instructive. Since the amount that can be
272. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1667 (1959).
273. Ibid.
274. Compare notes 168-77 supra and accompanying text with notes 245-51 suipra and
accompanying text.
275. See notes 168-77, 247 supra.
276. Unless this is so it would not follow that mergers are desirable in expanding
areas because absent economies of scale, the banking services and resources available would
be the same if there were a single large bank or many small banks; but see note 252 supra.
277. See generally BEATY, CORRESPONDENT BANKING (1951) ; City Banks Lure Coun-
try Dollars, Bus. Week, Oct. 24, 1959, p. 46; see also article in Banking, Sept. 1959, at
p. 43.
278. See notes 172 and 248 stepra.
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lent to any one borrower is limited to a fixed per cent of the bank's capital, 270
the .argument runs, larger banks are desirable in certain areas to service the
needs of large borrowers. But since there appears to be little pressure by large
borrowers to acquire large loans from any single bank, this argument may be
directed at a straw man. These businesses tend to be geographically decentral-
ized and usually place a loan through a number of banks in areas where they
operate.280 Moreover, such businesses are likely to find it cheaper to obtain
large amounts of credit through public offerings of short-term notes.2 8M In-
dividual borrower limits are "relatively unimportant" in the rejection of small
business loan applications.282 But even if the demands of some borrowers can-
not be satisfied at a single bank, that bank can invariably make funds available
by participating with its correspondent in a joint loan.283 To the extent that
the alternative of the correspondent relationship is available to minimize the
consumer advantages of large scale operations in the case of other banking
services, competition should not be subordinated to service considerations.
Moreover, to subordinate competition to prospects of better service except
where economies of scale are pronounced, may be self-defeating. For, with less
competition there will be little incentive to improve the services which large
banks are allegedly in a unique position to offer. Indeed, when the number of
competitors becomes so small that one bank knows that any service innovation
it introduces may be copied immediately by others, innovation becomes un-
profitable to the extent that it can be duplicated by competitors. Hence, service
considerations should take priority over competition only if it can be shown
that large banks alone can and indeed will provide the needed services.28 4
In considering "the preservation of competition," against which solvency
and service considerations must be weighed in the Bank Holding Company
Act, the Federal Reserve Board seems to have mishandled statistical data. In
focusing on the data, the Board has used statistics referring to concentration
of banking offices and deposits. Notwithstanding that little weight is given to
279. See note 172 supra.
280. Smith, New York Banking's Troubled Giants, Fortune, April, 1958, p. 115. The
large loan limit argument assumes that large businesses prefer borrowing at a single bank.
Why this should be true is unclear because in dealing with other suppliers, these businesses
often prefer to buy from a number of firms so that they are not dependent upon a single
source. Moreover, since one bank may negotiate a participation loan as a representative of
the others, this technique seems equally convenient.
281. GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POuCv 442-45 (3d ed. 1955).
282. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FINANCING SMIALL BUSINESS 417 (1958).
283. See First New York Corp., 44 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 902, 910 (1958); Naber,
Participation Loans, Banking, January 1958, p. 49. In a survey conducted by Banking
Magazine 67% of the banks replying said that their correspondent had participated in some
of their loans; only 3% reported that this facility was unavailable to them, Banking, Sept.
1959, pp. 43, 47.
284. CoMMIssIoN oN MONEY & CREDIT, MONEY AND CREDIT 165 (1961) ("Mergers
that result in operating economies and which are forced by competition to pass on the bene-
fits .. , should be encouraged. .. ").
[Vol. 71: 502
BANKING COMPETITION
predicted changes in concentration, 28 5 considering each banking office a separate
alternative seems incorrect because all offices of branch banks and all banks of
holding companies are included within the term "offices." 2 6 To compound its
error, the Board has ignored such real alternatives as savings and loan asso-
ciations.28 7 Furthermore, since providing credit is a major banking contribu-
tion to the economy, the focus of the Board upon deposits to the exclusion of
loans and investments 288 is unjustified. In a sense, the Board is attempting to
ascertain the extent of banking competition by focusing on concentration in
raw material (deposits) markets, with no reference to concentration in pro-
duction and selling (loans and investments) markets.
The defect of ignoring loans and investments is duplicated in Board analysis
of overlapping primary service areas since these areas are limited to 75 per cent
of a bank's deposits.28 9 In addition, even where the test of overlapping areas
may be an adequate measure of the competition eliminated by a proposed
transaction, the Board has impaired the usefulness of the test by approving
mergers and acquisitions on the theory that the character of one bank's de-
positors differs from the character of the other's.290 For example, it is highly
probable that there is strong competition between neighboring banks even
though there is a 15 per cent difference between them in the proportion of busi-
ness and individual depositors,291 because both banks can offer identical ser-
vices to each group. Aside from these misapplications, the use of primary ser-
vice area overlap analysis alone is inherently inadequate. Except for the un-
usual situation where applicant banks have proposed branches with predictable
primary service areas, 292 the use of overlaps ignores the problem of potential
competition. A finding that two banks are not presently competing should not
end the matter. So long as they remain independent, potential competitors,
there is always a chance of competition; merger or acquisition precludes this
possibility.20 3
But however inadequate the Board's attempts to determine "whether . . .
the effect of [holding company] acquisition ... would be ... consistent with
285. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
286. See note 181 upra and accompanying text.
287. See note 188 supra and accompanying text. But in approving mergers both the
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC have considered interinstitutional competition,
CouP. CurR. REP. Cas. No. 39; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 3, 21.
288. See notes 181, 183, and 184 supra and accompanying text.
289. See note 181 supra.
290. See note 199 supra and accompanying text. See also Com. Cum. REP. Cas. No.
5; FRB REP. Cas. No. 5; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 3, 8. Since in other cases these agencies
justify mergers because some non-bank institutions are so similar to banks as to offset the
effects of decreased bank competition, supra note 287, it is interesting that in these cases
the merging banks can be found to be so dissimilar that competition between them which
the merger would eliminate is unimportant.
291. See FRB REP. Cas. No. 5; Firstamerica Corp., 45 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 134, 137
(1959).
292. See note 198 upra and accompanying text.
293. See Central Wisconsin Bondshares, Inc., 47 FED. REsmEv Burr. 760, 763 (1961).
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... the preservation of competition" have been, they are more responsible than
the attempts of the Board and the other two banking agencies to "take into
consideration the effect of [mergers] on competition." Notwithstanding that
the statute mandates banking agency consideration of competitive factors, the
agencies apparently give slight attention to them 294 unless the Attorney Gen-
eral indicates that competition will be substantially lessened.295 Although this
procedure is tolerable if the Attorney General's findings are responsible, in
most cases the Attorney General gives no reasons, 296 or at least no convincing-
ly documented reasons 297 for his conclusions, if he draws any.29s Since his
opinions are of questionable weight anyway because they are merely advisory,
his failure to include in them detailed analysis demonstrating in appropriate
cases that competition would be substantially lessened renders them particular-
ly unhelpful. If the Attorney General supported his conclusions, the banking
agencies would at least be forced to adduce detailed evidence in rebuttal in-
stead of relying on conclusionary generalizations.
But even if this procedure induced more deliberate decision-making, it is
doubtful that the outcomes would be different not only because of the weight
given to the solvency and service considerations discussed above, 299 but also
because the merger (or acquire) -to-compete argument, validated by Con-
gress,30 0 provides the banking agencies an easy way to find mergers increasing
competition.3 0' To give weight, however, to the argument that mergers or
holding company acquisitions involving small or medium-sized banks stimulate
competition in areas dominated by large banks seems unwarranted. In view
of the wide range of service which the correspondent relationship enables a
smaller bank to offer,39 2 it is uncertain, in the absence of detailed study by
banking agencies or Congress, whether a larger bank has any appreciable
competitive advantage. Moreover, this merger-to-compete argument overlooks
294. See ComP. CuRR. REP. Cas. Nos. 8, 13, 14, 21, 24, 25, 31, 36, 41, 43; FRB REP.
Cas. No. 10; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20 (effect on competition
not mentioned).
295. See Comp. CURp. PEP. Cas. Nos. 2, 7, 37, 39; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 2, 5, 13; FDIC
REP. Cas. No. 15.
296. See CoMsP. CURR. REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 18, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41;
FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 3, 4, 6; FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 9, 16, 17.
297. See Co-mP. Cuaa. REp. Cas. Nos. 2, 5, 7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32,
33, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16;
FDIC REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20.
298. In some cases the Attorney appears to have drawn no conclusions. CoMP. CuRR.
REP. Cas. Nos. 8, 21, 50, 52, 55; FRB REP. Cas. Nos. 1, 11, 14, 15, 17; FDIC REP. Cas.
Nos. 5, 19, 21. Perhaps the requirement that the report of its Attorney General be "sum-
mary" accounts for the lack of detail. However, even though all his reports are summary,
they vary considerably in length and detail, intimating that they represent the total of his
reasons and conclusions.
299. See notes 268-84 supra and accompanying text.
300. See note 254 supra and accompanying text.
301. See notes 255-56 supra and accompanying text.
302. See note 277 supra and accompanying text.
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the disadvantages of decreased alternatives. Especially in banking, where entry
is limited to assure the likelihood of survival of all entrants, any decrease in
the number of potential competitors increases the degree to which remaining
banks will consciously follow each other's actions, decreasing incentive to im-
prove operations.30 3 In addition, decreased alternatives may mean decreased
credit availability to the marginal risk borrower. °4 Balanced against such dis-
advantages, significant reductions of alternatives in several cases, based on un-
supported views that a sufficient number remain, and on the highly question-
able theory that competition will be stimulated, seems unwarranted. By con-
centrating on merger and acquisition as means to produce large banks, Con-
gress and the banking agencies have failed to consider that greater bank size
can be achieved by other means consistent with competition, such as using
retained earnings or acquiring additional capital.30 5
Congressional approval of a different standard of competition is justified, at
least with regard to mergers, on a regulated industry or public utility analogy.
Since mergers in other regulated industries are not subject to competitive
standards as strict as those in unregulated industries, the argument runs, bank
mergers should receive the same treatment because banking is a regulated in-
dustry.300 But this argument ignores significant differences in the purpose and
extent of regulation of different public utilities. While economies of scale have
induced the government to guarantee monopoly benefits to most public utilities,
government has compensated for the absence of competition by rate and service
regulation to protect consumers. But since banking displays no significant
economies of scale,3 0 7 the industry would be no more efficient if operated as a
monopoly or oligopoly under price and service regulation. And the controls
which do seem necessary-those directed at solvency and money creation-
are consistent with competition. 308
Arguably, since these banking statutes do not exempt the industry from
operation of the antitrust laws, the Sherman and Clayton acts might be em-
ployed to prevent anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. 30 9 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act proscribes "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
303. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
304. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
305. Cf. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1668-73 (1959).
306. See note 253 supra.
307. See notes 15-26 supra and accompanying text.
308. See Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 332-33, 102 N.W.2d 777,
795 (1960).
309. State antimonopoly law appears to have been used successfully on tvo occasions:
State v. Bankers' Trust Co., 157 Mo. App. 557, 138 S.W. 669 (1911) ; Peoples Savings
Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960). Compare Hall v. San Jacinto
State Bank, 255 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
On banking and the antitrust laws, see generally Berle, Banking Under the Antitrust
Laws, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 589 (1949); Ramsey, Banks and the Antitrust Laws: An Un-
solved Problem, 37 A.B.A.J. 427 (1951) ; Gruis, Antitrust Laws and Their Application to
Banking, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 89 (1955), 73 BANKING L.J. 793 (1956); Funk, Anti-
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restraint of trade ;,,31o section 2-punishes "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt .... or combine or conspire ... to monopolize any part of [inter-
state] trade or commerce." 311 These sections have recently been applied to
banks for the first time ;312 such application, however, may well prove ineffec-
tive. Both sections prohibit combinations which have sufficient power to exclude
competitors 313 or to control prices.31 4 While bank mergers or acquisitions can
be shown to exclude existing competitors, proof that entry has been barred by
the transaction is highly unlikely because entry of new banks into an area is
directly controlled by government agencies rather than by market forces. And
price control evidence is difficult to adduce, except where monopoly exists, be-
cause the most restrictive effects which might result from the transaction-price
leadership, conscious parallelism or other forms of oligopolistic behavior-have
not been held violative of the Sherman Act without proof of a specific agree-
ment.3 15
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, designed to limit incipient mergers, appears to
be a more useful tool. It provides that:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital ... or ... of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 3 6
The use of "may be" and "tend" was purposely included to avoid the Sherman
Act's strict requirement that "actual competitive effects" be proved by per-
mitting a finding of violation when there is a reasonable probability of a
substantial lessening of competition317 Judicial and administrative interpreta-
tion of this provision dictate that consideration be given to decreased com-
petition in all relevant markets 318 -in banking: loans, investments, trust ac-
counts, etc., as well as deposits. Attention must also be given to the trans-
trust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 12 Bus. LAw. 496 (1957), 75 BANXING L.J.
369 (1958); Wemple & Cutler, Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust Laws, 16
Bus. LAW. 994 (1961).
310. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1960).
311. 26 Stat 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. 1960).
312. Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1961, p. 1. See note 326 infra. In 1954 a mortgage
banking association, which included several banks, was charged with restraint of trade in
FHA mortgages. The case was dismissed for lack of evidence. United States v. Chicago
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. II1. 1954).
313. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524 (1948).
314. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
315. See Ar'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 41 (1955); NEALE, THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 49-54, 81-94 (1960).
316. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
317. ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 115-18 (1955). But see NEALE, op.
cit. mpra note 315, at 449-55.
318. See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953),




action's "long range competitive consequences" to determine the effect on
potential competition.319 Moreover, proof that strong competition will remain
after the transaction would seem to be no defense if the competition eliminated
were substantial. 320 The argument that mergers or acquisitions should be ap-
proved to enable the resulting or acquiring bank to increase production of
loans to compete with larger banks is not recognized by the courts.321 And in
considering the effect on competition both the Attorney General 322 and the
courts 3 23 can be expected to avoid the mere conclusionary generalizations of
the banking agencies and to study in detail the patterns of competition before
and after the merger as well as many other relevant factors.324 Unfortunately,
section 7 applies only to bank stock acquisitions ;325 bank mergers, however,
are invariably effected by asset acquisition.32 In addition, while section 7
excepts the plight of the failing business, judicial determination of imminent
failure might be too time consuming and inexpert to prevent bank failures.
Some of the advantages of section 7 could be retained and some of the dis-
advantages eliminated if the following measures were adopted. First, the FDIC
merger provisions and the Bank Holding Company Act should be amended to
limit banking agency jurisdiction to banks alleging imminent or predictable
failure. Second, section 7 should be amended to apply to banks only if a bank-
ing agency has no jurisdiction over a merger or acquisition transaction. Where
the agency has jurisdiction, it would invoke the previously discussed rescue
procedures-immediate merger or acquisition if failure is imminent, or solvency
correction measures, if practical, under continued agency supervision and threat
of supervised sale if failure is not imminent but predictable. And, because of
the agency's exclusive jurisdiction, agency approved transactions would be
immune from subsequent antitrust prosecution.827 Third, the FDIC Act and
the Bank Holding Company Act should be repealed insofar as they conflict
319. Id. at 127.
320. See id. at 127-28 ("The test is whether the amount of competition lost is sub-
stantial.").
321. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1668-73, 1675 (1959).
322. NEALE, op. cit. supra note 315, at 211 n.1.
323. See id. at 209-14.
324. Although representatives of the banking agencies characterized the § 7 test as
quantitative, Hearings on Regulation of Bank Mergers Before Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 67 (1959), this interpretation does not appear
to be correct, A-r'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 122 (1955); NEALE, op. cit.
supra note 314, at 452.
325. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
326. Ibid.
327. Friction between the banking agencies and the Department of Justice has been
intense and constant since passage of the merger statute. See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1961,
p. 41; id., April 16, 1961, § 3, p. 1; id., Sept. 3, 1961, § 3, p. 1; id., Sept. 18, 1961, p. 45. On
five occasions the Department attacked under the antitrust laws transactions which the
banking agencies had previously approved. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1961, p. 61; id., March
2, 1961, p. 35; id., March 3, 1961, p. 33; id., August 30, 1961, p. 43- id., Sept. 9, 1961, p. 1.
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with this procedure. These statutory changes would bring most bank mergers
and acquisitions within section 7, but would delegate the problem of the fail-
ing bank to an expert agency. That faltering banks should be handled by one
agency, rather than by the three presently considering such problems, seems
preferable in the interest of uniform standards.3 28
Since bank holding companies are presently subject to section 7,329 this so-
lution would not affect existing competitive standards for further acquisitions.
It would, however, facilitate the acquisition of failing banks. In addition, if the
present prima facie legitimacy of Board-approved acquisitions were eliminated
by adoption of the proposed amendment, the Department of Justice might be
less reluctant to enforce section 7.330 The legislative history of the federal bank
merger statute reveals that the banking agencies opposed section 7 standards
because a quantitatively-determined reduction in competition would invalidate
many desirable mergers.33 ' These were said to include situations
where there is a reasonable probability of the ultimate failure of the bank
to be acquired; or where because of inadequate or incompetent manage-
ment the acquired bank's future prospects are unfavorable and can be cor-
rected only by a merger with the resulting bank; or where the acquired
bank is a problem bank with inadequate capital or unsound assets and the
merger is the only practicable means of solving the problem; or where
several banks in a small town are compelled by an overbanked situation
to resort to unsound competitive practices, which may eventually have an
adverse effect on the condition of such banks, and the merger would cor-
rect this situation.3 32
Consequently, the banking agencies argued that these special bank situations
merited a different competitive standard. 333 But the problem in each situation
described-"ultimate failure," unfavorable prospects, "inadequate capital or
unsound assets," "adverse effect on the condition of such banks"-is bank sol-
vency. If, on the agencies' own illustrations, this is the primary characteristic
setting banks apart from other industries, this problem alone should be isolated
and treated differently. And apart from a problem of bank solvency, there is
no warrant for allocating responsibility for competitive determinations to bodies
as non-expert as their conclusionary generalizations in the absence of detailed
statistical data have shown the banking agencies to be.
328. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 14; cf. Too Many Bosses in
Banking, Bus. Week, November 7, 1959, p. 182.
329. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
330. That banldng agency approval is considered a factor in antitrust litigation is shown
by the Attorney General's condition in one case that approval could be given by the Comp-
troller of the Currency only if the fact of approval were not introduced as evidence in a
subsequent suit. See N.Y. Times, August 23, 1961, p. 43.
331. See note 324 supra.
332. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960).
333. See note 324 supra.
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